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ABSTRACT
Recent studies on fairness in automated decision making systems
have both investigated the potential future impact of these decisions
on the population at large, and emphasized that imposing “typical”
fairness constraints such as demographic parity or equality of op-
portunity does not guarantee a benefit to disadvantaged groups.
However, these previous studies have focused on either simple one-
step cost/benefit criteria, or on discrete underlying state spaces. In
this work, we first propose a natural continuous representation of
population state, governed by the Beta distribution, using a loan
granting setting as a running example. Next, we apply a model of
population dynamics under lending decisions, and show that when
conditional payback probabilities are estimated correctly 1) “opti-
mal” behavior by lenders can lead to “Matthew Effect” bifurcations
(i.e., “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer”), but that 2) many
common fairness constraints on the allowable policies cause groups
to converge to the same equilibrium point. Last, we contrast our
results in the case of misspecified conditional probability estimates
with prior work, and show that for this model, different levels of
group misestimation guarantees that even fair policies lead to bi-
furcations. We illustrate some of the modeling conclusions on real
data from credit scoring.
1 INTRODUCTION
Data-driven decision making systems generally try to maximize
some domain-specific utility, which, if unconstrained, has the poten-
tial to damage disadvantaged groups in the process [21]. To avoid
this outcome, the study of fair treatment in automated decision
making commonly focuses on ensuring that automated decisions
follow the moral compass of an ideal society; this society being
one in which decisions and societal outcomes are not based on
immutable characteristics such as race or gender. Most past work
in this area has focused on enforcing constraints that provide some
notion of fairness upon the decision making process, such as de-
mographic parity (ensuring equal representation of groups in the
decisions), equality of opportunity (ensuring equal true positive
rates among different groups), or blindness (ensuring protected
attributes are ignored entirely in the decision making process, even
through surrogate features). Prior work shows that these notions
are unfortunately fundamentally incompatible with each other in
most situations [13]. Furthermore, these safeguards are made based
on a short snapshot of the process, namely, the model’s immediate
outcome. In response, recent studies have looked into the impact of
fair decisions over time, finding that some constraints that enforce
equal treatment can actively harm disadvantaged groups.
As a running example that we use throughout this paper, con-
sider the task of a bank deciding on individuals to give loans as
a function of a given person’s (estimated) probability of paying
back the loan; this setting is common through the literature on
fair decision making, though the same principles apply to a wide
variety of other tasks, such as granting school admissions [12],
making predictions of criminal recidivism [15], and many others.
There are many competing incentives in this setting: banks are
not incentivized to give loans that will not be repaid, but a his-
torically disadvantaged population, without access to loans, may
have a harder time re-establishing credit and improving the overall
financial state of the group without receiving a loan.
In this paper, we consider the fair decision making setting as
an iterative, repeated process, where e.g. loan granting decisions
will have future effects on the probability of different groups to
repay. We then consider the impact of different fairness constraints
in this setting. In particular, we make three contributions in this
work. First, we propose and motivate a continuous population
model, governed by the Beta distribution, that captures the entire
population state in terms of propensity to pay back a loan. We
show than under this model, several common notions of fairness
can be expressed through a simple analytic parameterization of the
cumulative distribution function.
Second, we propose a model of population dynamics that cap-
tures how granting or denying loans impacts the population as a
whole. We show that lenders operating to maximize returns in-
dependently for each population group can naturally lead to the
“Matthew Effect” [19], summarized by the adage, “the rich get richer,
the poor get poorer”, where the final population means of different
groups bifurcate based upon their initial state. Yet, we show that
for a set of intuitive assumptions of population dynamics, any con-
straint, according to our definition, that enforces equal treatment
guarantees that groups converge to the same distribution; This sug-
gests that at least that within our proposed model, the seemingly
negative impacts of some notions of fair treatment suggested by
previous work may not dominate the long-term well-being of all
groups.
Last, we address the problem of estimation and stereotypes to
show that when payback probabilities are incorrectly estimated
among groups (and indeed, previous studies have found that auto-
mated systems are less effective on non-majority groups, often a
result of the data collection process), there can still be bifurcations
of the population, even under fair policies. Although these results
are largely dependent upon the assumptions we make regarding
population distributions and dynamics, we find that this proposed
model both reinforces prior work, that fair policies can lead to con-
vergence, while coming to a different conclusion on the effect of
stereotypes. In contrast with previous work, we show that in this
model differing levels of misestimation among groups, except in
trivial cases, result in fair policies never being able to bring groups
to convergence. This suggests that models of population dynamics
imply different outcomes for the effect misestimation, to a greater
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2 3 INTRODUCTION
degree than has currently been explored. We also assess the effects
of these results using a publicly available data set of loan repayment
probabilities for different demographic groups.
2 RELATIONS TO PAST WORK
Recent work on fairness in machine learning arose out of a growing
concern for biases seeping into algorithmic procedures [1, 2, 4, 12,
15]. This phenomenon was highlighted by a report from the White
House on the possible harms that biased classifiers and decisions
can have on society as a whole [21]. As a result of these alarms,
researchers increased focus on methods for mitigating the influence
that intentional and unintentional biases have on learned classifiers
and decisions. Although the approaches vary, they can be generally
structured into three classes of approaches, (1) fair preprocessing of
data [29] (2) fair post-processing of outputs [9, 13] and (3) inherent
fairness in models [7, 14, 24, 28].
Approaches to Fair Learning. Through preprocessing methods
such as omitting information that leads to biases [8] or by intro-
ducing new representations [17, 26] researchers have attempted
to ensure that model inputs, and their resulting outcomes, have
varying levels of independence from protected attributes. However
Datta et al. [6] show that proxy discriminators often remain in the
data, as confounders for protected attributes are still a part of other
features that are necessary for a model. Proxies can force a difficult
choice of whether or not to leave features strongly correlated with
protected attributes in the data or remove features that are neces-
sary for model accuracy. To combat this effect, many researchers
have introduced methods of ensuring that models are unable to
learn biases as a part of training [24, 30], or that the training itself
is able to inherently conform to some notion of fair treatment or
fair outputs for individuals [18].
Societally, there is no accepted true notion of fair treatment. As
a result, additional work had to be done to constrain the possibility
of approaches so that well-meaning individuals are not led to dead-
ends and impractical applications [13, 23]. This area has found that
fair constraints cannot generally be combined to make a decision
more fair. Some ideas of fair treatment are incompatible with each
other except in trivial cases or impossibly specific circumstances.
Impact of Fair Policies. The majority of prior work has been in a
static setting in which the impact of these decisions are not studied,
ensuring only that they conform to some notion of fair treatment.
However, there is a growing body of work [11, 16, 20] on the impact
of fair policies and fair classifiers on the population. Liu et al. [16]
showed that even though many “fair” policies may sound beneficial,
they can actually harm the population over time. For example, when
applying demographic parity [3, 31] in a loan setting, if required
representation proportition for both groups is too large, the policy
will allow many people to receive loans they cannot repay, causing
the group financial state to drop. Mouzannar et al., [20] focused
on a similar setting, and also show a similar yet counterintuitive
result: that in some cases, entirely uncontrained policies lead to
convergence of the groups.
Our Contributions. Here, we focus on the implications of fair
policies on a population over time. We build upon work in [16]
and analyze the long-term equilibria of policies that enforce differ-
ent selection rates among advantaged and disadvantaged groups.
However, extending the prior work of Mouzannar et al. [20], which
focused on discrete state settings and Bernoulli random variables,
we assume a full continuous parameterization of the population
success profiles, governed in our case by the Beta distribution. Un-
der this assumption, we conveniently find that we can capture fair
policies with a simple analytic parameterization of the cumulative
distribution function. We show that unconstrained policies can
indeed reinforce inequalities amongst the two groups; however,
we show that in this setting, enforcing any fairness constraint will
cause the two groups to converge in distribution. However, in con-
strast to the setting of Mouzannar et al. [20], we show that under
our model, the effect of misestimations or stereotypes leads to a
setting where populations do not converge.
3 PROBLEM SETTING AND POPULATION
DISTRIBUTIONS
When assessing whether to grant a loan, the quantity of interest to a
lender is the conditional probability of an individual repaying a loan
given relevant features such as credit score, income, or repayment
history. Under our assumptions, we posit that loan repayment (at
least at an observable level) is a fundamentally stochastic concept,
and so this conditional probability is not merely an estimation
artifact but a genuine real-valued property of individuals.
For this setting, our initial goal is to model the distribution of
these probabilities over the entire population. There are many pos-
sible distributions which model economic well-being of the popu-
lation, however, given that we are restricted to the [0, 1] space of
repayment probabilities, we choose to use a standard distribution
over this space, the Beta distribution, to model the population; we
show in a later section the fits of such distribution to real data. We
want to stress that we are not claiming that this model perfectly
captures real world effects, but rather that is a simple and intu-
itive setting where the effects of bias and misestimation can be
illustrated.
Assumption 3.1. At time t , the distribution of payback probabili-
ties for individuals from group (i), denoted by π (i)t (x), is governed by
a Beta distribution
π
(i)
t (x) = Beta(x ; µt , c) (1)
where Beta(x ; µt , c) is the density of a Beta distribution in a “mean-
parameterized” form, such that for standard beta distribution param-
eters, a,b, µt = E[x] = aa+b , and c is a shape parameter, c = a + b.
(Note that this implies a = cµt and b = c(1 − µt )).
In the multi-group setting, we consider two groups that have
different means, µ(0)t and µ
(1)
t , where µ
(0)
t < µ
(1)
t implies that at time
t , group 0 is a disadvantaged group and 1 is an advantaged group
who share the same shape c > 0. A bank grants loans to each group
according to a threshold A(i) for i ∈ {0, 1}, where individuals in
group i who are above this threshold receive a loan. In general, the
threshold will typically be selected by a lender as a function of the
current mean, such that A(i) = τ (µ(i)) for policy τ : [0, 1] → [0, 1].
Fair policies will typically specify τ such that some proportion s
3(which could be the total selected population, the true positive, etc),
will be equalized over the two groups.
An appealing property of the Beta characterization of population
state is that several common fair policies have a simple and analytic
form, as specified by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Setting a threshold
A(i) = τ (s, µ(i)) = I−11−s (µ(i)c + k1, (1 − µ(i))c + k2) (2)
in which I−1 is the inverse of the regularized incomplete beta function,
s describes the equal treatment proportion (proportion in demographic
parity, true positive rate in equality of opportunity, etc), with
k1 > −min{cµ(i), cµ(j)}
k2 > −(c −max{c µ(i), c µ(j)}).
Any such τ is a fair thresholding policy in which Equality of Oppor-
tunity, Demographic Parity, and Blindness are special cases.
Specifically, k1 = 0,k2 = 0 in proposition 3.2 implies demo-
graphic parity, k1 = 1,k2 = 0 implies equality of opportunity, k1
or k2 → ∞ implies blindness, and the intersection of equality of
opportunity and k1 = 0,k2 = 1 implies equalized odds. We provide
a derivation of this proposition in Appendix A.
For the remainder of this paper, the function, τ denotes a thresh-
olding policy as defined by the above proposition. We claim that
all τ enforce some form of fair treatment, as this set comprises
non-decreasing, right-continuous functions of group repayment
probabilities, where any group with a lower average repayment
probability receives a lower acceptance threshold. In other words,
under this set of policies, a disadvantaged group will never have
more strict requirements for a loan application than an advantaged
group.
It should be noted that this proposition is essentially a special-
ization of [16, Section 6], which shows that for a general class of
distributions, many fair policies can be expressed by terms involving
the inverse cumulative distribution function; the appealing element
to the Beta distribution setting is that all of these policies have a
simple analytic form governed by the two parameters mentioned
above.
4 DYNAMICS
We now introduce our model of population evolution under loan-
granting policies. In general, any Markovian evolution of the popu-
lation distribution π (for now we drop the group superscripts for
notational clarity) will evolve over time according to
πt+1(xt+1) =
∫
πt (xt )F (xt ,xt+1)dxt , (3)
where the transition kernel F : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R+ governs the
evolution of the state. This is essentially the simple continuous-
time version of state evolution considered e.g., in Mouzannar et al.
[20]. Although fully general, this form is not particularly useful
in practice, because most easily-parameterized transition kernels
would lead to subsequent states no longer characterized as a Beta
distribution. For this reason, we forgo the general transition kernel
dynamics, and concentrate on a special case where the dynamics are
governed by a simple update to the distribution parameters directly
(we later relate this to a specific form of transition kernel).
The hypothesis that underlies our model is that granting loans
(when they are repaid) has the potential to produce positive upward
mobility for a population, while granting loans that are not repaid
or failing to grant loans at all can produce downward mobility. In
more detail: we treat a loan being granted as a net benefit for its
recipient, similarly to real-world influence in which small business
loans open up the opportunity for financial growth through per-
sonal enterprises and mortgage loans allow upward social mobility
through better neighborhoods, schools, and housing investments.
Conversely not receiving a loan, or receiving a loan and failing to
pay it back, has the potential for stagnation and decline in opportu-
nities, education, and investments.
Specifically, given the discussion above, we formalize our dynam-
ics model according to the update to the mean parameterization of
the distribution over time
Assumption 4.1. The dynamics of an arbitrary group distribution
πt are governed by the following update of the mean µt+1 (with c
remaining constant over time)
µt+1 = f (A, µt ) = β · p+(A, µt ) · µ+(A, µt ) + ν · (1 −p+(A, µt )) (4)
where ν ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ [0, 1] are free parameters, p+ denotes the
proportion of the population above the threshold A that is chosen
by the lender and µ+ are the estimated parameters of the current
repayment pattern; in this single parameter model, µ+ is the expected
repayment probability of the distribution for those who receive a loan
p+(A, µt ) =
∫ 1
A
πt (x)dx , µ+(A, µt ) =
∫ 1
A x πt (x)dx
p+(A, µt ) . (5)
This update function, f , captures the following intuition: First,
for the proportion of the population that receives the loan p+(A, µt ),
the parameter that governs the next state, µt+1, will move towards
the mean of the population selected for a loan µ+(A, µt ), scaled
by the parameter β . Setting β < 1 captures the fact that there
is an asymmetry between the harm of failing to repay and the
benefit of repayment, with the consequences of failing to repay
typically seen as more harmful than the benefits of repaying. These
dynamics describe the positive or negative feedback effects of the
community, where successfully repaid loans can improve the popu-
lation, but failure to repay loans can damage the population. Second,
for the proportion of the population that does not receive a loan,
1 − p+(A, µt ), the population will shift toward the nominal mean ν ;
this captures the negative effects of being denied access to credit.
We want to emphasize that, like the choice of Beta distribution
to begin with, we are not arguing that this model necessarily fits
any particular data set. Rather, we seek a general and tractable
model that intuitively characterizes the effects of giving or not
giving loans to a population, where we can analyze the effects of
fair policies.
Under the general transition kernel formulation above, this
model is essentially positing the transition kernel
πt+1(xt+1) =
∫
πt (xt )F (xt ,xt+1)dxt
=
∫
πt (xt )Beta(xt+1; µt+1, c)Beta(xt ; µt , c) dxt .
(6)
4 4 DYNAMICS
We believe that this transition kernel is a necessary assumption;
if we choose a transition kernel not based on the beta distribution as
above, we would break our assumption 3.1 after a single time step.
In order to model dynamics of a specific probability distribution,this
requirement naturally comes about.
While this is obviously a very specialized setting, we argue that
it captures many intuitive properties of actual lending environment,
and it is thus illustrative to consider the impact of fair policies and
(mis)estimation in this setting.
Understanding Fair Policies. Under this model, we want to deter-
mine whether or not a fair policy is equalizing over time: does it
move groups that follow the same dynamics (i.e., the same β and
ν terms) but different initial conditions towards the same distribu-
tion? Should a policy equalize populations, following [10], the fair
class of “group-aware” policies can be considered as a short-term
intervention allowing for ‘group blind” long-term policies on the
population as a whole. We formalize a policy that leads to equilibria
as follows.
Definition 4.2. A thresholding policy, τ (µ), is said to be asymp-
totically equalizing over two groups if for dynamics
µ
(i)
t+1 = f (τ (µ
(i)
t ), µ(i)t ), i ∈ {0, 1} (7)
then the means converge in the limit regardless of their initial values
lim
t→∞ | µ
(0)
t − µ(1)t | = 0. (8)
4.1 The Equilibrium Points of Fixed Policies
Our first class of results shows that for any fixed policy (that is,
τ (µt ) = A0,∀µt ), there is a unique equilibrium point µ∞. Such
a policy may be beneficial to both groups, beneficial to one and
harmful to the other, or harmful to both (here beneficial means that
the group ends at a mean greater than their original mean, µ∞ > µ0,
and harmful means the opposite).
We begin by considering ν and β from assumption 3.1, and ob-
serving how these free parameters describe the equilibrium of cer-
tain specific, fixed policies. By fixing τ (µ) = 1, we deny all indi-
viduals from receiving loans, thus pushing the population mean
to ν . Additionally, by fixing τ (µ) = 0, we accept all individuals;
this policy pushes the mean µt+1 to βµt , which approaches 0 in
the limit. Thus, these two fixed policies each have an equilibrium,
where
f (A, µ∞) = µ∞, (9)
that attracts every µ toward µ∞. For other values of A, by solving
equation 9, we find that there exists an attracting µ∞ equilibrium
for every threshold A that satisfies definition 4.2. In addition, we
show in Appendix B that these stable equilibria are unique for all
thresholds, A, that come from a fixed policy.
Theorem 4.3. Under the aforementioned dynamics, every fixed
threshold A0 has a single unique equilibrium point. Furthermore, this
equilibrium point is stable, in that the iteration µt+1 = f (A0, µt ) will
converge in the limit to this equilibrium point.
In general, there is no closed form expression for the fixed point
µ∞, but it can easily be computed numerically by simply finding a
root of the one-dimensional nonlinear function (9).
µ∞
A
µ
(1)
0
µ
(0)
0
ν/β
ν
Figure 1: We show an example of this µ∞ equilibrium curve
where each A has a unique equilibrium point that attract µ.
For advantaged µ(i)0 and disadvantaged µ
(j)
0 , the green, yel-
low, and red section shows thresholds that lead to positive,
mixed, and negative equilbria respectively.
Given the existence of an equilibrium point of any fixed thresh-
old, for two initial group means µ(0)0 and µ
(1)
0 , we can characterize
certain fixed threshold policies as either beneficial to both groups,
beneficial to one, or harmful both, depending on the relation of µ∞
to µ(0)0 and µ
(1)
0 .
Definition 4.4. The curve of fixed points for two groups is sepa-
rated to 3 partitions,
1) A positive equilibria is a fixed point according to Definition 4.2,
where for µ(i)t and µ
(j)
t at time t = 0, µ∞ ≥ max{µ(i)0 , µ
(j)
0 }.
2) A negative equilibria is a fixed point where for µ(i)t and µ
(j)
t ,
µ∞ ≤ min{µ(i)0 , µ
(j)
0 }.
3) A mixed equilibria is a fixed point, where for µ(i)t and µ
(j)
t , µ
(i)
0 <
µ∞ < µ(j)0 .
Finally, we can characterize the “maximum social welfare” policy
as the choice of τ (µt ) = A0 that achieves amaximal value of µ∞ (and
which thus must be beneficial to both groups). This is characterized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5. Under a fixed policy τ (µ) = A0,∀µ, the policy
that leads to the maximum equilibrium point is a fixed threshold at
τ (µ) = νβ .
Putting these points together, we can view the possible outcomes
for different fixed policies in relation to the group initial states,
shown in Figure 1. This curve roughly parallels the outcome curve
from [16], but with the important distinction that it refers to infinite
horizon group outcomes rather than single-step outcomes.
4.2 Institution Rewards and Optimal Policies
Although the existence of fixed points in the dynamics for fixed
policies is an interesting feature of the model, in most cases a lender
would want to decide which threshold to use (or even change thresh-
old dynamically), so as to maximize some utility over time. In this
section, we therefore introduce an institution utility, and charac-
terize the optimal policies that result from the standard Bellman
equations for this setting. The first main takeaway from this section
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is that, under the dynamics model we introduced above, if a lender
is allowed to follow an optimal, unconstrained policy for each group
independently, then this may lead to the Matthew effect, given as a
bifurcation where groups with an initial mean state µ0 over some
threshold will see their means increase, while groups with an initial
state below this threshold will see their means decrease. However,
the second takeaway from this section is that if we further restrict
the class of policies to jointly obey any fairness constraint defined
by proposition 3.2 over the two groups, then the means of the two
groups will always converge.
Institution Utility. In the loan-granting setting, if a bank loans
one unit of money to an individual, the bank expects some interest
R on their investment, while if an individual cannot repay their
loan, then the bank loses this unit of money. We thus introduce a
reward function that captures this specific utility, д, for the bank
as,
д(A, µ) = p+(A, µ)((1 + R)µ+(A, µ) − 1)) (10)
The reward function models the intuition above, where a bank
seeks to maximize its utility by ensuring the largest fraction of
the population receives a loan that generates profit for the bank.
Typically, the bank seeks to maximize its utility by selecting an
interest, R, that is not too high, which would force people to fall
into delinquency, but not too low, which unnecessarily decreases
their profit.
Optimal Policies via the Bellman Equation. We can characterize
the policies which maximize the discounted infinite horizon return
via the standard Bellman equation
J⋆γ (µ) = maxA
{
д(A, µ) + γ J⋆γ (f (A, µ))
}
(11)
where J⋆γ (µ) denotes the optimal value function (the expected sum
of discounted reward under the optimal policy), and γ ∈ [0, 1)
denotes a discount factor that trades off between immediate and
future reward. We also use the notation τ⋆γ (µ) to characterize the
optimal policy, which is simply the threshold A that achieves this
maximum.
As with the fixed point itself, there is no closed form expression
for the optimal value function or policy. However, because the
quantity only involves a two-dimensional function over A and µ,
we can easily compute the optimal function numerically via spline
approximation and dynamic programming. Furthermore, we can
easily characterize the one-step greedy policy as, γ = 0.
Proposition 4.6. The one-step greedy policy for γ = 0 is given
by the fixed policy
τ⋆0 (µ) =
1
1 + R . (12)
Bifurcations Under Unconstrained Optimal Policies. This policy
is unique as it does not depend on the state, µ, and thus, when
applied to two groups with different initial states, µ(0)0 and µ
(1)
0 ,
would lead both to converge to the same mean. However, as time
passes (0 < γ ), the resulting policy is not fixed, and in practice can
lead to a bifurcation of the final state depending on the initial state
of the different group populations. This point is highlighted by the
following example.
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Figure 2: An illustration of the Matthew Effect, wherein a
bifurcation of population well-being leads to individuals or
groups who benefit from a system continuing to benefit and
individuals or groups who struggle are unable to reap the
same rewards.
Example 4.7. Consider the case of the dynamics specified above
with c = 1.6, ν = 0.2, β = 0.99, institution reward given by R = 0.25
and discount, γ = 0.6. Then the all initial means with µ0 ≥ 0.76
converge to a final mean of µ∞ = 0.976 while all initial means with
µ0 < 0.76 converge to a final mean of µ∞ = 0.617. The illustration of
this effect is shown in Figure 2. Thus, for two groups with µ(0)0 below
0.76 and µ(1)0 > 0.76 the means of the two groups will never converge.
This bifurcation results in the colloquially-named, “Matthew
Effect" where the advantaged group improves their state, while the
disadvantaged group is never able to reach the same level of growth.
This effect was originally coined as a result of well-known scientists
receiving a disproportionate level of credit in their collaborations or
through the independent discoveries of multiple researchers. The
early advantages of one individual or group will often lead to a
multiplicative effect where they receive a greater return in their
future endeavors, while those without this early advantage will
require much more time or support to be able to reach the same
heights [5, 22, 27].
For an institution to achieve the optimal reward for sufficiently
high discount factor, γ , the model causes the bank to operate at a
loss so as to improve the financial state of the largest proportion of
people. As this proportion’s state improves, the bank recoups its
losses returning a greater utility than either the utility maximizing
policy or the social good policy. However, for a given time horizon,
if the bank cannot recoup its losses by improving the state of a
group sufficiently, the policy disregards this group and allows them
to settle at different equilibria.
Convergence of the Optimal Policy Under Fairness Constraints.
A key feature in the above setting is that the lender was free to
impose the same “optimal” policy on the state of each of the two
groups independently, with no fairness constraint. This in fact
leads to a situation where an individual from disadvantaged group
was required to have a much higher probability of repayment in
order to receive a loan than an individual in the advantaged group.
In contrast, if we require that the joint policy over both groups
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obey any fairness constraint defined by proposition 3.2, then this
situation cannot occur. Indeed, as we show in this section, if the
joint policy (note that this can be any policy, not just the optimal
one) is constrained to obey any fairness constraint as defined in
Proposition 3.2, then under these same dynamics both groups will
converge to the same fixed point.
Before providing a theorem on the equilibria of fair policies,
we detail the implication that institutional rewards have on the
allowable policy .
Lemma 4.8. For all rewards, R ≤ βν − 1, the optimal control model
is never incentivized to set the threshold less than νβ .
For small rewards, it may be possible for a loan-granting entity
to focus more on the advantaged group that provides a higher profit.
As the reward increases, the institution is more likely to provide a
loans to disadvantaged populations only if it causes no more harm
than a policy with a lower reward.
Constraining our reward, R ≤ βν − 1, we show whether fair
policies in this model will lead to convergent equilibria for groups.
In essence, these policies enforce an ordering such that if µ(j) > µ(i),
thenA(j) ≤ A(i). By enforcing thresholdR ≤ βν −1, and by extension
A ≥ νβ , the model focuses on the cases in which institutions set a
reward that is based upon a reasonable interest, R. If any institution
wants to guarantee that they will not enforce a bifurcation among
demographics, we will show that there must be some notion of fair
treatment among groups. In addition, by disallowing a bifurcation,
the institution has the potential to increase its long-term utility
over a group-blind, unconstrained policy.
Theorem 4.9. Under the optimal thresholding policy for the de-
scribed dynamics, with reward R ≤ βν − 1, under any fairness con-
straint, τ , the two groups will always reach parity.
Proof. We separate fairness constraints into two cases. blind
policies and group fairness policies.
Blind Policy . Under a blind policy, in which both groups always
have the same threshold, as there is a single unique µ∞ for each
threshold, both groups are drawn to the same µ∞. Thus, both groups
will always reach parity.
Group Fairness Policies . For any group’s threshold under a fixed
τ , A(i) = I−11−τ (µ(i)c + k1, c − µ(i)c + k2), 4.8 states that the optimal
policy for each group will be τ such thatA(i) ≥ νβ ,∀ i . µ∞ is strictly
decreasing for A ≥ ν .
Under group fairness policies, if µ(1) ≤ µ(2), due to the inverse
beta regularized function being amonotonically increasing function
with respect to µ, threshold A(1) is guaranteed to be less than or
equal to A(2). As µ∞ is strictly decreasing for all A ≥ νβ , then
µ
(1)
∞ ≥ µ(2)∞ . If µ(1) ≤ µ(2) and µ(1)∞ ≥ µ(2)∞ , then as each µ steps
to their individual fixed points, they must intersect. When they
intersect, the population reaches parity and from that moment on,
both groups share the same fixed point. □
5 DYNAMICS UNDER STEREOTYPES AND
MISESTIMATION
Up to this point, we have been focusing on the ideal setting in
which the distribution of repayment probabilities is known exactly.
However, in real-world scenarios, we have a degree of uncertainty
in a distribution’s ordering. In other words we have focused on the
setting in which we know πt (x) = Beta(x ; µt , c) exactly. However
in practice we will likely not know the true parameters of this
distribution, and even will a proper mean a difference between the
estimated and true c values can lead to a divergence between the
“true” underlying distribution and the estimated one.
For the simplest case, suppose that we predict probabilities at
the limit of available features, ie. measuring based solely on the
protected attribute. In this case, the probability of repayment re-
duces to a point-mass centered at the demographic’s mean ability
to repay. If the institution enacts a race-blind policy with threshold
above the average of the disadvantaged group, then this group will
revert to ν , while the advantaged group evolves according to the
dynamics above where p+ = 1, and thus ultimately reverts to mean
ν as well.
Any other degree of informationwill cause a population to evolve
according to some combination of the true update from Assumption
4.1, and the group mean µt . We thus introduce a mispecification
parameter, α , that encapsulates this uncertainty in a distribution’s
ordering. As stated above, in the limit where α = 1, the policy is
effectively selecting randomly, and the group declines according
to βµ. As more information is known, α → 0, then the population
evolves according to the true dynamics above. We formalize a new
evolution function,
Assumption 5.1. The dynamics of an arbitrary group distribution
πt with policy τ (µt ) = A, are governed by the following update for
true mean µt and mispecification parameter, α (with c remaining
constant over time),
f (A, µt ) = β · P+(A, µt ) · ((1 − α)µ+(A, µt ) + (α µt ))
+ ν · (1 − P+(A, µt ). (13)
Generally for two demographics, as stated above, a high enough
α has the potential to lead to a bifurcation, however there remains a
possibility for two groups to reach equality as long as these groups
have an equal amount of uncertainty.
Theorem 5.2. Under the optimal thresholding policy for two groups
with equal shapes, c , thresholds, A, constrained above νβ according to
lemma 4.8, and any fairness constraint, τ , as long as the two groups
have equal α mispecifications, they will still reach parity.
Proof. We again split this proof into a blind policy case and a
group fairness case. Trivially, if α = 1, then the group distributions
are a point-mass at their current mean, so every thresholding policy
will harm the population and force all groups to ν . If α = 0, then
the problem is the same as Theorem 4.9.
Blind Policy. µt+1 is now a function of both the current true µt ,
approximate optimal threshold, A, whereas in the previous case,
µt+1 was a function of only the true optimal threshold, A. With
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Figure 3: Different levels ofmisestimation lead to thresholds
that share completely distinct fixed points fromone another.
Here, ν = 0.2, β = 0.99, c = 2
uncertainty, the previous equation changes to
f (A, µ∞) − µ∞ = β (1 − α)P+(A, µ∞)µ+(A, µ∞)
+ (1 − P+(A, µ∞)) ν
+ µ∞(βP+(A, µ∞)α − 1) = 0.
(14)
This equation is identical to the earlier function for µ∞ except
that β is scaled by 1 − α and it adds the term µ∞(βP+(A; µ∞)α − 1)
to the previous sum. This new term is always negative, so the peak
of the µ∞ curve is shifted closer to A = 0. In this new equation,
there still remains a unique µ∞ for each threshold A, so under a
blind policy where both groups have the same threshold, they also
share the same µ∞. Thus, a blind policy still reaches equality.
Group Fairness Policies. We find that µt+1 is maximized at A =
α β µ−ν
β (1−α ) , so again the social welfare policy is a threshold here. Using
lemma 4.8, the threshold A under the optimal policy is always
greater than or equal to α β µ−νβ (1−α ) .
This expression A = α β µ−νβ (1−α ) ∈ R instead of A = νβ ∈ [0, 1]. As
such, the optimal social welfare threshold must be the threshold,
A, that minimizes the absolute value of the derivative of the µt+1
with uncertainty,
f (A, µt ) = β · P+(A, µt ) · ((1 − α)µ+(A, µt ) + (α µt ))
+ ν · (1 − P+(A, µt )). (15)
If this derivative is negative for all A ∈ [0, 1], then no matter what
thresholding policy is used, the total population will be harmed.
Similarly, if the derivative is positive, then the population will be
improved for all A.
When the derivative does not have a root at anyA ∈ [0, 1], every
policy will update µt until there exists a root for some A ∈ [0, 1].
Once µ(i) for both groups reaches a point where the root exists for
some A, then the dynamics from the previous proof take over. The
optimal policy will always be greater than α β µ−νβ (1−α ) , so if µ
(1) < µ(2),
then A(1) ≤ A(2), so µ(1)∞ ≥ µ(2)∞ . Thus, the population µ’s must
converge to reach their respective equilibria.
It should be noted that greater levels of uncertainty α correspond
to a greater influence of the current mean, so as α increases,max µ∞
decreases. So a greater level of uncertainty decreases the potential
final mean of the population. □
Alternatively, if two groups have differentα , then we show below
that they cannot reach equality.
Theorem 5.3. Under the optimal thresholding policy for two groups
with equal shapes, c , thresholds,A, constrained above νβ , and any fair-
ness constraint, if two groups do not have the same α mispecifications,
they will never converge except in trivial instances.
Proof. Given dynamics of the form,
f (A, µt ) = β · P+(A, µt ) · ((1 − α)µ+(A, µt ) + (α µt ))
+ ν · (1 − P+(A, µt ), (16)
the derivative of f with respect to the mispecification, α is,
∂ f
∂α
= βP+(A, µt )(µt − µ+(A, µt+1)). (17)
This derivative is always negative for A , 0, so the function is
strictly decreasing for non-trivial thresholds, A , 0, 1. As the dy-
namics are strictly decreasing with α , the fixed point with respect
to a specific threshold is strictly lower for any two uncertainty α
parameters.
In this case, where the mispecification parameters are not equal,
there always exist a set of two thresholds in the system with an
α1 that can map to a pair thresholds with α2, that share a fixed
point, however this case is trivial as there is no guarantee that
these thresholds will be chosen under a policy. This mapping only
comes about as the range of function of µ∞ with α0 and α1 > 0,
is a subset of the range of every other function of µ∞ with α1 and
α1 > α0 > 0. □
It should be noted that the trivial cases that we mention above
consist of a set of four thresholds that ensure convergence regard-
less of misestimation or initial distribution. This set is τ such that
everyone from both groups are denied loans, which forces the mean
of both groups to 0; τ such that everyone from both groups are
granted loans, which also forces the mean of both groups to 0; the
last two policies come out of the fact that if an institution is able
to set a different acceptance threshold for every group, specific
threshold can be found on either side of the peak that leads to
the same long-term parameters. Regarding the last case, unless the
thresholded proportion, defined bby s in proposition 3.2, is specified
to an incredibly specific and sufficiently large level of numerical
precision, this case will not occur.
Prior work [20] has similarly analyzed the effect of these stereo-
types in a similar setting, however while dynamics that govern the
Bernoulli distribution of repayment probabilities show that when
a equal treatment constraint causes a decrease in loans to the ad-
vantaged group, and µt is underestimated for the disadvantaged
group, regardless of whether the advantaged group is underesti-
mated or overestimated, the populations will still reach equality.
A second case, where a greater percentage of the disadvantaged
group is granted a loan, with a negative bias on the advantaged
group and a positive bias in the advantaged group also leads to
equality. However, under our model, regardless of the acceptance
rates for each group, as long as they do not have the same level of
misestimation, they cannot reach equality. This implies to us that
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Figure 4: (Top) The histogram of repayment probabilities
by race (Left = Black, Right = Non-Hispanic White). (Cen-
ter, Left) The change in population wellbeing for individu-
als under an unconstrained optimal policy. (Center, Right)
The change in population wellbeing for individuals under
demographic parity. (Bottom, Left) The change in popula-
tion wellbeing for individuals under a blind policy. (Bottom,
Right) The change in population wellbeing for individuals
under Equality of Opportunity.
the effects of stereotypes is more model-specific than has previously
been explored.
6 SIMULATED RESULTS
We examine the impact of several fairness policies according to the
dynamics introduced above. We simulate the evolution of popula-
tions on the data set of 301,526 preprocessed TransUnion TransRisk
scores from [9, 25]. This data set is separated by race including
Black, Non-Hispanic White, Hispanic, Asian, and includes a cumu-
lative distribution over credit scores of the population for each race
and a distribution of 90-day delinquency rates over credit scores
with respect for each race. We process this information into a proba-
bility distribution of repayment probabilities in a three step process.
We first calculate the derivative of a smooth interpolation of the
given cumulative distribution in order to receive the probability of
individuals in each race having a specific score. We then find the
histogram of non-delinquency rates after 90 days with respect to
the probability distribution of credit scores in Figure 4. Both the
histogram of delinquency rates and distribution of scores are plot-
ted parametrically, in order to describe the repayment probability
vs density per demographic.
After retrieving a histogram of repayment probabilities, we fit a
Beta distribution to the graph and calculate µ and c as in assumption
3.1. These parameters are used to find the optimal control policy for
two races (Black, Non-Hispanic White) for each notion of fairness
treatment. We then observe the evolution of µ under each policy.
As stated previously, our model requires the shape c to be equal for
all groups, we fix the shape as the average of any two group shapes.
In addition we assume a profit loss ratio for the lender of R = 0.21
and no uncertainty in the model, α = 0.
In the case of this simulated data, removing all fair constraints
leads to a bifurcation; the advantaged group becomes much better
off, while the disadvantaged group remains stagnant. Whereas
adding constraints that enforce Equality of Opportunity improves
both groups and leads them to positive equilibria. The blind policy
leads groups to equilibria as well, however, it instead harms both
groups, leading them to a worse off state than every other policy.
Yet, special attention should be drawn to the demographic parity
example. Demographic Parity ultimately creates a positive equi-
libria, however, it first causes temporary harm in the advantage
population in order to lead both groups to a positive equilibria,
where everyone ends up better of. While the policy causes active
harm [16] for one group, this harm does not dominate long-term
dynamics, over time the policy leads to a better state than where
the advantaged group began.
In the limit, policies that maximize group well-being, maximize
reward, so a lender in the case presented here is better off under a
fair policy. However, it is important to note that whether a specific
fair policy remains optimal compared to an unconstrained optimal
policy or another fair policy depends on the task at hand and initial
conditions. Modeling the expected effects of these policies would
allow institutions to determine the best policy for a given utility
function.
7 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
This work considered the iterative processes of fair decision mak-
ing. We formalized a Beta-distribution-based population model,
showed that several existing fairness conditions can be expressed
as special cases of a general class of fair policies, and then analyzed
a proposed dynamical update equation for this model. We showed
that under these conditions, although unconstrained policies can
lead to bifurcations of different population means, any fair policy
according to our proposition 3.2 will lead to a single equilibrium
for both groups. However, under the case of mis-estimated repay-
ment propabilities, these bifurcations can continue for two different
groups.
Although these results naturally depend on the modeling as-
sumptions, they highlight that fact that under reasonable condi-
tions, ensuring that data-driven decision-making system accurately
estimate group distributions is a major requirement for reaching
equitable long-term world states. As historically underrepresented
groups traditionally suffer from worse predictive performance, this
is a important but worthwhile challenge.
Future Work. Here, we focused on one possible model for popu-
lation dynamics. However, there are many equally or more valid
models for modeling a population in a resource granting setting.
Even in this case, we found that the behavior of stereotypes and mis-
estimation is more model specific than we feel has been previously
explored. A larger and more thorough explanation of how misesti-
mation statistically affects outcomes on a population and ways of
mitigating these effects is an important avenue for enforcing fair
treatment among groups.
Additionally, this work emphasized constraints that enforce fair
policies, however, many methods of fair treatment may not have
clear constraints, for more example, a decision being counterfac-
tually fair [14]. As fair treatment is not universally defined, re-
searchers have many opportunities of finding new ways to deter-
mining the impact of more abstract notions of fair treatment.
Training classifiers to conform to a given notion of fair treatment,
requires an understanding of whether or not these classifiers will
actually be beneficial. As shown in our results, it is entirely possible
for an unconstrained “un-fair” policy to lead to a better world-state
than a tightly constrained fair policy. Just policies should not only
formally treats individuals equitably but ensure that decisions will
result in equitable world-states for individuals who agree with and
conform to a given idea of fair treatment.
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APPENDIX
A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2
Proof. We separate this proof into 4 sections, the first describes how to formalize demographic parity as a function of the τ proportion,
the second describes how to formalize equality of opportunity as a function of the τ true positive rate, the third describes how to formalize
equalized odds as a function of the τ1 true positive rate, and τ2 false positive rate, the fourth describes how to formalize blindness as a
function of the τ threshold, and the fifth is a corollary that restates the possibility of these separate definitions of fair treatment coming from
a single class of fair policies parameterized by k1 and k2,where A(i) = I−11−τ (µ(i)c + k1, c − µ(i)c + k2).
(1) Demographic Parity
For the distribution of repayment probabilities, π it (x) = Beta(x ; µit , c), with respect to group i , the proportion of the population above
a given threshold A is defined as
∫ 1
A(i ) π
i
t (x)dx . A policy that follows demographic parity seeks to find thresholds A(i), such that for
each group, ∫ 1
A(i )
π
(i)
t (x) dx =
∫ 1
A(j )
π
(j)
t (x) dx ∀ i, j . (18)
By solving the integral, we find an equivalent form,∫ 1
A
πt (x) dx = 1 − I (A; µc + k1, c − µc) = τ ;k1 = 0 (19)
By solving this new equation where I is the incomplete beta regularized function, we then fix some tau proportion that each group,
parameterized by µ, must adhere to. We find the threshold by solving the equation for A threshold
A(i) = I−11−τ (µ(i)c + k1, c − µ(i)c);k1 = 0 (20)
for any group i .
(2) Equality of Opportunity For the distribution of repayment probabilities, π it = Beta(x ; µit , c), with respect to group i , the true
positive rate of repayment is given by the expected repayment ability of those who are granted a loan compared to the expected
repayment ability of the entire population. We then define a policy that satisfies equality of opportunity as some thresholds A(i),A(j)
that satisfy ∫ 1
A(i ) x π
(i)
t (x)dx
µ
(i)
t
=
∫ 1
A(j ) x π
(j)
t (x)dx
µ
(j)
t
. (21)
As in demographic parity we simplify this integral to,∫ 1
A x πt (x)dx
µ
= 1 − I (A; µc + k1, c − µc) = τ ;k1 = 1 (22)
We then solve this equation for each group to find their individual thresholds that correspond to the fixed τ .
A(i) = I−11−τ (µ(i)c + k1, c − µ(i)c);k1 = 1 (23)
for any group i .
(3) Equalized Odds Equalized Odds is a further constraint on Equality of Opportunity, in which both the true positive and false positive
rates must match among each group, formally written as
Pr
{
Yˆ = 1 | i = 0,Y = y} = Pr {Yˆ = 1 | i = 1,Y = y} ;y ∈ 0, 1 (24)
The case for the true positive rate, y = 1 is the equality of opportunity case above. We now specify how to formulate the matching
false positive rates.
For the distribution of repayment probabilities, π it (x) = Beta(x ; µit , c), with respect to group i , the false positive rate of repayment is
given by 1− the expected repayment ability of those who are granted a loan, compared to 1− the expected repayment probability of
the entire population. This can be formally written as:∫ 1
A(i ) (1 − x) π it (x) dx
1 − µ(i)t
=
∫ 1
A(j ) (1 − x) π
j
t (x) dx
(1 − µ(j)t )
∀ i, j . (25)
As before, we simplify these integrals,∫ 1
A (1 − x) πt (x) dx
1 − µt = 1 − I (A; µc, c − µc + k2) = τ ;k2 = 1. (26)
We again solve this equation for the matching false positive rates, τ ,
A(i) = I−11−τ (µ(i)c, c − µ(i)c + k2);k2 = 1. (27)
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A policy that satisfies Equalized Odds is then taken as any policy in the intersection of this false positive threshold and the Equality of
Opportunity case. There is only one non-trivial τ that satisfies Equalized Odds for any two groups.
(4) BlindnessWe define a blind policy as a policy where a single threshold A is used for all groups. Generally this could be expressed as
some τ ∈ [0, 1], however for consistency, we can also formulate this case using the inverse beta regularized function.
For the complete beta function described as,
Beta(a,b) = Γ(a)Γ(b)
Γ(a + b) (28)
,
If a → ∞, the influence of b → 0 and vice versa. This way for the beta function parameterized by µ and c , if k1 or k2 approaches
infinity, the distinction between some µ(i) and µ(j) becomes negligible. This way, any policy where k1 or k2 approaches infinity
functionally treats and two groups as equal. Due to this effect, we then define a shared, blind threshold as,
A(i) = I−11−τ (µ(i)c + k1, c − µ(i)c + k2);k2 →∞ or k1 →∞. (29)
for all groups i .
(5) General Policy Class In each of the above cases, scaling k1 and k2 give several different policies that correspond to different notions
of fair treatment in the literature. We conjecture that as k2 and k1 increase, this leads to stricter notions of individual fair treatment
culminating in blindness where there is no difference in treatment for individuals of different groups. As such, we use
A(i) = I−11−τ (µ(i)c + k1, c − µ(i)c + k2) (30)
as a general class of fair policies where Demographic Parity, Equality of Opportunity, Equalized Odds, and Blindness are special cases.
□
B PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
Proof. Any equilibirum point of our dynamics, µ∞ is given by a root of the equation
f (A, µ) − µ . (31)
It is straightforward to observe that there exists some stable equilibrium point, because for µ = 0
f (A, µ) − µ = ν > 0 (32)
for any threshold A. Similarly, for µ = 1,
f (A, µ) − µ = β − 1 < 0. (33)
Thus, the curve must intersect f (A, µ) − µ at some point, and must approach it from the positive direction on the left and the negative
direction on the right; this correponds to a stable attracting equilibrium.
Due to the somewhat complex form of these functions, it is more difficult to show analtyically that there exists a unique equilbrium point.
However, the number of free parameters involved in these equations is small (A, c , β , ν ), and so it is trivial to numerically show that for a
grid over these values, the equilbrium point is always unique. The one exception here is for c , which is unbounded in range, but because the
distribution collapses to a point mass as c →∞, after some threshold cmax, futher increases in c will have only ϵ effect on the resulting roots.
□
C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.5
Proof. According to our dynamics, we define an update for the population mean, µ, as
µt+1(A; µt ) = β · p+(A; µt ) · µ+(A; µt ) + ν · (1 − p+(A; µt )), (34)
where p+ is the proportion of the population above the threshold A, µ+ is the mean repayment ability of individuals above the threshold A,
and β , ν are free parameters.
We find the threshold that maximizes this function by finding the derivative with respect to A,
dµt+1
dA
= −A
−1+cµ (1 −A)−1+c−cµ (Aβ − ν )
Beta(µ, c) . (35)
For A ∈ (0, 1), this equation has only one extrema at νβ . Additionally, if A < νβ , then this derivative is positive and if A > νβ , then the
derivative is negative, so the extrema at A = νβ , must be the maximum.
As a result at any time t , a threshold at A = νβ results in the greatest benefit to social welfare. □
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D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.6
Proof. For a single step, the optimal policy, τγ (µ) is found as,
J⋆γ (µ) = maxA д(A, µ), (36)
which corresponds to maximizing our reward function,
д(A, µ) = p+(A, µ)((1 + R)µ+(A, µ) − 1)) (37)
∂д
∂A
= −A
−1+cµ (1 −A)−1+c−cµ (−1 +A +AR)
Beta(µ, c)
0 = −A
−1+cµ (1 −A)−1+c−cµ (−1 +A +AR)
Beta(µ, c)
0 = A−1+cµ (1 −A)−1+c−cµ (−1 +A +AR)
0 = −1 +A +AR
1 = A +AR
1 = A(1 + R)
A =
1
1 + R
The derivative has a single extrema at A = 1R+1 . Similarly to the social welfare case, if A <
1
R+1 , then the derivative is positive, and if
A > 1R+1 , then the derivative is negative, so the extrema must be a maximum point.
Thus, the policy that maximizes reward at a single step is A = 1R+1 .
□
E PROOF OF LEMMA 4.8
We claim that by setting the reward, R ≤ 1ν − 1, the optimal control model is never incentivized to set the threshold less than ν . The model
is always incentivized to make decisions that either increase the current mean, which increases the ultimate reward, or maximizes their
current reward.
In the first case, dµt+1dA is strictly increasing if A ≤ νβ , so when the optimal control model tries to improve the state at the next step, the
optimal threshold is at A = νβ .
The reward,
д(A) = P+(A)(µ+(A)(R + 1) − 1) =
∫ 1
A
π (x)(Rx + x − 1)dx , (38)
at any time t is maximized by selecting threshold, A, that maximizes this integral.
π (x)(Rx + x − 1) < 0 for all x < 11+R . If R ≤
β
ν − 1, then, this expression is always negative for A < νβ . So, if A < νβ , the reward is always
lower than A ≥ νβ . Thus the optimal control model is incentivized to choose an A ≥ νβ .
Any policy chosen will be a trade-off of the state maximization and reward maximization at the current state, and in either case, the
policy has no incentive to select a threshold less than νβ . In realistic scenarios, R should not reach this bound. If the resource (ie. loan) is
beneficial, then ν can be assumed to be small. For example if ν = 0.2, then the reward of R = 4 corresponds to a bank making 4 times the
profit from their loan over the set time horizon, and which is unreasonable in a short time horizon.
As a note, if R = βν − 1, then the optimal policy is a fixed policy at νβ . As we’ve shown before, the optimal social welfare policy is also a
fixed policy at A = νβ . In this case, under the greedy policy, fixing A =
1
R+1 , if R =
β
ν − 1 then both the greedy and social welfare policies
coincide.
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